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Chapter 1
 
Introduction
 
Denials of Service (DoS) attacks consume the resources of a remote host or 
network that would otherwise be used for serving legitimate users. DoS continue to be a 
pervasive problem for Internet services, as evidenced by the recent denial of service at 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [7]. Such attacks require each attacking 
node to perform only a small amount of work, relying on the cumulative efforts ofmany 
machines to overload the victim node. Attacks range from simple Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP) ping requests to sophisticated attacks that are difficult to 
distinguish from a sudden spike in legitimate use. 
In a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, the perpetrators may spend 
weeks or months subverting hundreds or thousands ofmachines by exploiting well­
known security flaws. Once the machines are subverted, the perpetrator installs tools to 
execute an attack. On command, the prepared machines (known a "zombie") 
collectively target a specified victim with a packet stonn consisting of repeated packet 
requests. The packets may also have forged return addresses, allowing one machine to 
generate requests that appear to be coming from hundreds of machines, and making the 
sources of the attack difficult to trace. This problem may intensify since newer operating 
systems that are being introduced may make it easier to spoof IP addresses [6]. Halting 
these attacks is nontrivial and typically relies on filtering at the router (or just waiting out 
the "packet stonn"). 
New multimedia applications and message passing demand more bandwidth and 
are less tolerant to jitters, delays and lost packets than the traditional data applications 
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that have so far dominated the networks. Real-time quality of service (QoS) of the 
network is essential for such applications on low capacity links and over long hauls. 
Although the issues of QoS and resource reservation have been studied in great 
detail, but the QoS protocols do not offer any fonn ofsecurity. In this paper, we explore 
these issues by implementing two protocols that provide QoS with a measure of security 
for peer to peer networking. The first protocol reserves the best secured path for 
multimedia applications and the second protocol finds the most secured path for a 
message on an ad-hoc basic. 
1.1 Motivation: 
According to CNN, In February 2000 a number of popular websites were slowed 
or shut down by distributed denial of service attacks. Amazon.com, Buy.com, CNN.com, 
eBay, E*Trade and ZDNet were all victims ofthese attacks. Analysts estimated that 
Yahoo! lost $500,000 in e-commerce and advertising revenue when it was knocked 
offline for three hours. [14] 
Part of the problem with DoS attacks is the sheer number ofways in which they 
can operate. A DoS attack can be launched to overwhelm a target's Web site, CPU, 
memory, network bandwidth or routers. It can also work by taking advantage of known 
flaws in products. [5] 
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks are another variation. Such assaults, which are 
more difficult to detect than other DoS attacks, involve short-lived bursts of spurious 
traffi,c directed at a target from multiple sources and are aimed at slowing network 
perfonnance. The problem arises because almost all DoS attacks involve multiple 
2
 
networks and attack sources, many of which have spoofed IF addresses to make detection 
even harder. 
These alanning issues need to be addressed and plethora of design parameters 
must be considered in order to come up with a secure network system. 
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Chapter 2
 
Literature Review
 
2.1 DoS and DDoS: 
DoS attacks, when successful, make a system difficult or impossible to use. Some 
attacks crashes the systems, others merely make them so busy that no useful work is 
done. There are two principal classes of attacks: 
Logic attacks and flooding attacks. Attacks in the first class, such as the "Ping-of­
Death", exploit existing software flaws to cause remote servers to crash or substantially 
degrade in perfonnance. Either upgrading faulty software or filtering particular packet 
sequences can prevent many of these attacks, but they remain a serious and ongoing 
threat. The second class, flooding attacks, overwhelm the victim's CPU, memory, or 
network resources by sending large numbers of spurious requests. Because there is 
typically no simple way to distinguish the "good" requests from the '"bad", it can be 
extremely difficult to defend against flooding attack . 
The WWW Security FAQ [11] describes a DoS attack as: 
"an attack designed to render a computer or network incapable of providing 
nonna! services. The most common DoS attacks will target the computer's network 
bandwidth or connectivity. Bandwidth attacks flood the network with such a high 
volume of traffic, which all available network resources are consumed and legitimate 
user requests cannot get through. Connectivity attacks flood a computer with such a high 
volume of connection requests, that all available operating system resources are 
consumed, and computer can no longer process legitimate user requests." 
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Figure 1 (below) depicts the scheme of a simple DoS attack. The services will be denied 
until the source of the attack can be identified and calls from source can be blocked. 
Here, the attacker takes control of a computer (zombie) which then become the source for 
the actual attack. 
~I----------..I~~f--------..I~~ 
,,- Zombie VlcUm 
Figure 1: DoS attack [9] 
Consequently attackers have discovered new ways of bringing these system to its 
knees. They don't use single bosts for their attacks but they also cluster several dozens or 
even hundreds of computers to do a coordinated strike. The WWW Security FAQ [11] 
on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, as these fonns are called: 
"A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack uses many computers to launch a 
coordinated DoS attack against one or more targets. Using client/server technology, the 
perpetrator is able to multiply the effectiveness of the Denial of Service significantly by 
harnessing the resources ofmultiple unwitting accomplice computers that serve as attack 
platforms." 
Figure 2 depicts a DDoS network where the attacker controls one or more 
computers (masters), which then control several more zombies. This in turn means more 
pathways that need to be blocked, along with a dramatic increase in the amount of 
resources being consumed by the target. 
As we can see, there is only one attacker in a DDoS attack. The attacker takes 
over a number ofmasters. The masters control several zombies. And the zombies do the 
actual attack and bring down a network. 
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Zombie 
Figure 2: DDoS Attack [9] 
2.1.1 Spoofing: 
To conceal their location, thereby forestalling an effective response, attackers 
typically forge, or "spoof', the source address of each packet they send. Consequently, 
the packets appear to the victim to be arriving from one or more third parties. 
2.1.2 Filter: 
Consider a point-to-point communication network representing as a directed 
graph G = (Y, E), where V is the set of all nodes and E is the set of links in G. Let 1;(u. v) 
denote the set of all loop-free paths from u to where u, v E V. A routing algorithm and its 
computed routes lead to a subset R(u,.v) c((u, v). An IP packet M(s,t) with source lP 
address s and destination IP address t is routed through the network according to R(s,t). 
A filter [4] Fe: y 2 is a function defined for the link e = Cu. v) E E where this is 
interpreted to mean that a rouler in v acting as a peering inspects an IP packet M(s. t) 
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arriving on e, then decides whether to forward the packet (Fe(s,t) = 0), or filter-i.e., 
discard-the packet (Fe(s,t) = 1). We call Fea route-based packet filter with respect to R if 
FeCs,f) = °for e E R(s,!). 
With a slight abuse of notation, we can use "e E R(s.t)" to mean that link e is on 
some path belonging to R(s,t). Thus a route-based filter is safe in the sense that it does 
not discard packet that are potentially consistent with respect to R as judged locally at e. 
A route-based filter is maximal [4] if it satisfies Fe(s,!) = °if, and only if, there exists a 
path in R(s, f) with e as one of its links. Thus a maximal route-based filter carries out all 
the filtering of spoofed IP traffic that is possible without adversely affecting routing of 
non-spoofed IP packets as detennined by R. 
A semi-maximal [4] filter is a maximal filter which uses only the source IP 
address of a packet to out its filtering (i.e., a projection of Fe). In other words, Fe(s,t) is a 
semi-maximal filter with respect to R if 
Fe(s,t) = { 0, if e E R(s.v) for v E V; 
1, otherwise 
Hence, its filtering capability is, in general, less than that of its maximal 
counterpart. Although we lose in potential filtering power - but a semi-maximal filter can 
be represented by a filtering table in linear space, which brings it to the domain of 
feasibility, if not practicality. 
We include semi-maximal filters to achieve security features within a network. In 
this paper, filter and semi-maximal filter notation is used interchangeably. 
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Example: 
With packetfiltering executed at node 8, the spoofable address range at attack site 1. is 
reduced/rom SJ.9 = {O,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} to {O,I,2,3,4.. 5}. 
2.2 Routing on the Internet: 
Intemet[8] is a packet switched network where routing is done on a per packet 
basis. Devices called routers make the routing decisions. The routers are responsible for 
receiving and forwarding packets through the network. Each router maintains a routing 
table. which acts as reference to decide the next hop router to which a packet should be 
forwarded. Depending on how the routing tables are updated, routing can be classified 
into two categories: Fixed Routing and Adaptive Routing. 
2.2.1 Fixed Routing: 
Fixed routing is a simple routing scheme where a single pennanent route is fixed 
for each source and destination pair in the network. The routes are mostly fixed, unless 
there is a change in the topology of the network. Hence, in this case the routing cannot 
be perfonned on any kind of dynamic variables such as cost, delay or bandwidth. Fixed 
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routing requires the routing tables to be pre-configured and so is not capable of taking 
any action during congestion or network failures. 
2.2.2 Adaptive Routing: 
As the name implies, adaptive routing is adaptive to changes in the network. The two 
main conditions that influence the routing decisions are: network failure and congestion. 
Though adaptive routing sounds very attractive, it has its drawbacks too. 
•	 Algorithms to determine paths based on dynamic parameters get very complex, 
increasing the processing burden on the routers. 
•	 To make effective routing decisions, the routers have to be updated from time to 
time about the state of the network. But this update adds overhead to the already 
burdened network. 
Adaptive routing algorithms can be classified based on the way a router updates its 
information. If the adjacent routers initiate the update it is called the Distance Vector 
Routing algorithm, and if the updates are based on information from all the routers it is 
called the Link State Algorithm. 
2.2.2.1 Distance Vector Algorithm: 
Distance vector algorithms [15] based on a table giving the best route to every 
destination in the system. We have to define a "metric" in order to fmd the best route. In 
simple networks, it is common to use a metric that simply counts how many gateways a 
message must go through. In more complex networks, a metric is chosen to represent the 
total amount ofdelay that the message suffers, the cost of sending it, or some other 
quantity, which may be minimized. The main requirement is that it must be possible to 
represent the metric as a sum of "costs" for individual hops. 
9 
Formally, if it is possible to get from node i to node j directly, then a cost, d(iJ) is 
associated with the hop between I andj. In the normal case where all entities on a given 
network are considered to be the same, d(iJ) is the same for all destinations on a given 
network, and represents the cost ofusing the network. To get the metric ofa complete 
route, one just adds up the costs of individual hops that makes up the route. We assume 
that the costs are positive integers. 
Let d(i,j) represent the metric of the best route from node i to node j. It should be 
defined for every pair of nodes. d(i,j) represents the costs of individual steps. Formally, 
let d(iJ) represent the cost of going directly from node I to node j. It is infinite if i and j 
are not immediate neighbors. Here, d(i,i) is infinite. So, there is no direct path from a 
node to itself. Since the costs are additive, it is easy to show that the best metric must be 
described by 
d(iJ.) = 0, all i 
d(IJ) = mink[d(iJ) + d(kJ)], otherwise 
and that the best routes start by going from i to those neighbors k for which d.(i,k) + d(kJ) 
has the minimum value. 
Example: Dest Cost Next 
B 1 BI 
C 1 C 
D 00 
­
E 1 E 
F 1 E 
G 00 
­
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A graph of7 nodes. Initial cost vector at A. We are doing the routing from A's 
perspective. Initially A receives hello packets from its neighbors and updates its table 
accordingly. 
Dest Cost Next 
B 1 B ! 
C 1 C 
0 2 C 
E I .E 
F 1 E 
G 2 F 
After the first iteration, A's table has information for all the nodes. 
2.2.2.2 Link State AJgprithm: 
In these algorithms a router does not limit its updates only to its neighboring 
routers, rather the routing updates are flooded to all the routers in the network. Link state 
algorithms are so called because, instead of advertising a list ofdistances to each known 
destination, a router running a link state algorithm floods the network with state of the 
local link. The result is that all routers obtain the same database of collected 
advertisements, collectively describing the current map of the network. Using this 
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network map each router runs Dijkstra's algorithm [13] on it, resulting in shortest path 
distances to each of the destinations. 
In Dijkstra's algorithm we start from source towards destination. Steps in 
Dijkstra's algorithm: 
1.	 Set probe node to starting node. 
2.	 Probe neighboring node and tentatively label them with (probe node, 
cumulative distance from start). 
3.	 Search all tentatively labeled nodes for the minimum label, make this 
minimum node's label pennanent, make it the new probe node. 
4. If the probe node is the destination node, stop, else goto 2. 
Here, the distance part of the node labels is cumulative distance from the source node, not 
simply distance from the last probe node. 
2.3	 QoS Routing: 
Under QoS based routing, paths for flows would be detennined based on some 
knowledge of resource availability in the network as well as the QoS requirements of 
flows. The metrics used to compute the paths playa very important role in QoS routing, 
since these metrics represent the basic network properties of interest, such as residual 
bandwidth, delay, jitter and monetary cost. 
In our discussions we assume one metric on any link, i.e., bandwidth. 
The QoS routing problems can be divided into two major classes: unicast routing 
and multicast routing. Unicast routing aims at finding paths from source to the 
destination satisfying one or more constraints. On the other hand, multicast routing aims 
at finding an optimal tree such that the paths from the source to a set of destinations 
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satisfy one or more constraints. Generally speaking, unicast routing could be considered 
as a special case of multicast routing problem. This thesis deals with unicast routing 
problem. 
We first give an examp]e of delay-constrained unicast routing. We do that by 
explaining the BelLman-Ford-Moore (BFM) algorithm. 
2.3.1 The BFM algorithm: 
Consider a point-to-point communication network representing as a directed 
graph N = (V, E), where V is the set of all nodes and E is the set oflinks in N. The 
algorithm associates to variables with node u, namely CLABEL{u) and PRED(u). At any 
step in this algorithm CLABEL(u) represents the cost of a path from node s to node u and 
PRED(u) indicates the node from which node u has received its latest CLABEL value. 
Initially CLABEL(s)=O, CLABEL(u)=oc, for all u E V and u"* sand PRED(u)=u for all 
u E V. 
The general step in the algorithm is: 
Pick any link (u,v) such that CLABEL(u)"* 00 and CLABEL(v) > CLABEL(u) + 
Cu.v. Set CLABEL(v) = CLABEL(u) + cu,v and PRED(v) = u. 
If no such link is available, the BFM algorithm terminates. 
Here, t is the destination. At termination CLABEL{t) gives the cost of a minimum cost s­
t path. This path can be traced starting at PRED(t) and working backwards towards the 
source node s. 
We next present an efficient O{m,n) implementation ofBFM algorithm [13]. 
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In the following discussion scanning a node u means examining all the edges (u,v) and 
labeling the neighbor nodes ofu, if possible. A sweep of the BFM algorithm refers to the 
process ofscanning all the nodes 1,2,3 ,n in that order. 
Following is an implementation of the BFM algorithm using the concept of the 
sweep. 
The BFM algorithm: 
1.	 (INITIALIZATION) Set CLABEL(s) = 0, CLABEL(u) = 00, for all u E V and 
u"* s and PRED(u) = u, for all u E V. 
2.	 Perlonn a Sweep. 
3.	 If no node CLABEL value gets updated, STOP. CLABEL(t) gives the cost of the 
min-cost shortest s-t path. OtheIWlse, repeat step 2. 
It can be shown that after performing n sweeps the BFM algorithm will terminate, 
resulting in the time complexity of 0 (mn). 
Here, while scanning a node u during a sweep, the current value of CLABEL (u) i 
used to label the neighbors of node u. 
e----cu.v----e 
Q 10 4 
1 
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Initialization: 
(00) (00) 
10 
CLABE 
(0) Q5 6 (00) 
1 
(00) (00) 
Sweep 1: 
(10) (00) 
10 
ClABE 
(0) Q5 4 6 
1 
(1) (00) 
Sweep 2: 
(5) (7) 
10 
CLABE 
(0) Q5 
1 
(1) (2) 
15 
Sweep 3: 
(3)(4) 
CLABE 
10 5~(3)(0) Q 6 s )J
11 
(2)(1) 
Sweep 4: 
(3)(4) 
10 
ClABE 
(0) Q 4 s 
1 
(2)(1) 
So, the path is s-2-4-1. 
As we can see the BFM algorithm is only concerned with finding a QoS path 
from source to destination. It does not have any security features. To deal with situation, 
we have devised a QoS heuristic based on the BFM algorithm. To include security 
feature, we have use some of the nodes as filters. By using filters we are able to block 
some of the IP spoofing attacks. Using the filter infonnation we can traceback to a set of 
nodes, which are capable ofspoofing. 
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Next we talk about Bandwidth-Delay constrained QoS routing [16]. It is based on 
the standard Dijkstra's algorithm. 
2.3.2 Bandwidth-Delay Constrained QoS routing: 
The problem is defined as finding a path that has bandwidth greater than Band 
having total delay less than D. This algorithm first deletes all those nodes from the graph 
that has bandwidth less than B. From the remaining graph, we find the path with length 
less than threshold based on Dijkstra's algorithm. The algorithm is: 
1.	 Set dij = 00, ifbij < B 
2.	 Set L = {l}, Dj = b1i for alll~1 
3.	 Find ktL so that Dk = min D j 
IfDk> D, no such a path can be found and algorithm tenninates. 
If L contains node m, a path is found and algorithm terminates. 
L= Lu {k} 
4.	 For all I not belonging to L, set D j = min[Di,Dk+Dki] 
5. Goto step 3 
Step 1 removes the low bandwidth path and step~ 2-5 find a path satisfying delay 
constraint. 
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Chapter 3 
Thesis Objective 
In particular this thesis investigates 2 classes ofQoS routing algorithms, namely 
resource reservation algorithm and dynamic algorithms. In resource reservation 
algorithms, packets are sent on a particular path from a source once the path is computed 
and reserved for the source to destination communication. And in dynamic algorithms, a 
path is chosen from a node to a neighbor node on an ad-hoc basic till the packet reaches 
the destination. Distance Vector Algorithm is a dynamic algorithm whereas BFM and 
Dijkstra's algorithms are resource reservation algorithms. We take a look at DVA and 
BFM as they represent an algorithm from each class. As BFM is faster and more 
efficient than Dijkstra's, we chose BFM in this study. Our objective is to propose a 
secure DVA and secure BFM algorithm. 
The protocols are va.lidated defining security and QoS metri.cs. The two main 
objectives of this thesis are: 
1. Propose secure BFM and DAV QoS algorithms 
2. To evaluate the effectiveness of these secure protocols. 
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Chapter 4
 
Design
 
4.1 Assumption: 
We make certain assumptions for this study. 
1. All the links within the network is one-directional 
2. All the nodes are numbered 
3. The initial bandwidth of each of the links is supplied manually 
4. The system knows all the location of the ftlter locations 
Two Routing Algorithms are proposed in the following subsections. The first 
algorithm is based on the BFM algorithm and the second algorithm is based on the 
Distance Vector algorithm. 
4.2 Input: 
The algorithms work on a direct network structures with filters. Each node is 
numbered. We assume that we know the bandwidth available on each of the links 
(denoted by labels on each link). 
The network in the diagram below displays an example of a network structure. Here, the 
filters are displayed in bold color. This network diagram is used for the explanation of 
the protocols. 
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Figure 3: Input Example 
4.3 Secure BFM Algorithm: 
This algorithm finds a secure path from a source node to destination and reserves 
the path for future communication. It follows the Bellman-Ford-Moore algorithm to find 
most secure path. This protocol can be used for multimedia communications. 
In this case, there are fewer chances for a denial of service attack. The attacker 
must reside within the reserved set of nodes. But it takes more time to find a path from 
source to destination, as we need to first find the path, then establish connections and 
then send packets. Once a path is established from source to destination, only that 
discovered path can be used to send packets from the particular source to the destination. 
To send packets on a new path, a new connection needs to be established. 
20 
4.3.1 A Metric for Security: 
We need a security measure that can be used as a constraint along with bandwidth 
in this algorithm. We may find the securit.y measure by going through an example. 
In our input example: 
We have the nodes 6, 10 and 12 as filters. 
7 paths from node 1 to node 16
 
Path A 1-2-6-10-15-16
 
Path B 1-2-6-7-11-12-16
 
Path C 1-2-6-10-14-15-16
 
PathD 1-5-10-15-16
 
Path E 1-5-9-10-15-16
 
Path F 1-5-10-14-15-16
 
Path G 1-5-9-10-14-15-16
 
From each link, a filter can detennine its coverage: 
Filter 6 has only one input link - covers nodes 1 and 2 
Filter 12 has only two input links -link Icovers nodes 7 and 11, link 2 covers 
nodes 3, 4 and 8 
Filter 10 has three input links - link I covers nodes node 6 (which is itself a filter), link 2
 
covers 1 and 5, and link 3 covers nodes 1,5,9, 13
 
Let S(Fu) be the set ofnodes covered by filter i on link [.
 
Therefore,
 
S(F6./) = 1,2
 
S(FI2./) = 7, 11
 
21 
S(F/lu) = { } (empty) 
S(F/lu) = 1,5 
S(FIO. j ) = 1,5,9, 13
 
Given this scheme the spoofable nodes are:
 
Path A 1,2, 15
 
Path B 1,2, 7, 11
 
Path C 1,2, 14, 15
 
PathD 1,5,15 
Path E 1, 5,9, 13, 15
 
Path F 1,5, 14, 15
 
Path G 1,5,9, 13, 14, 15
 
Let PA be the set ofnodes in a path A 
Let UF:.A be the set of n filters in a path A 
I_I 
Let D be the destination node 
Let US(F,.I) be the spoofable set of nodes in a path 
'-I 
For example in path B. 
Path B 1-2-6-7-11-12-16 
S(F12.1) = 7, 11
 
In other words,
 
S(F6..>US(F,2.1) = {1,2,7,1l} =US(F,") for path B 
/-1 
The security measure for a path is therefore: 
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PA -clJF:.AUD)U«(jS(F:,,» 
/-1 '_I 
The best security path is therefore: 
n n 
max«(PIf -(UF:.AUD»U(US(F:,l» (I) 
;=1 i=l 
4.3.2 Modified Secure BFM algorithm: 
In the following discussion scanning a node v means examining all the edges (u,v) 
and labeling the neighbor nodes of u, ifpossible. A sweep refers to the process of 
scanning all the nodes as 1,2,3,.....n in that order. 
Following is an implementation of the algorithm using the concept of sweep. 
1. Initialization 
2. Sweep 
3. If for no node PA value gets updated, STOP. 
luitialization: 
The source node (suppose node 2) is named AI. AI names the nodes in its 
forwarding table as A2, A) ... and so on. If there is no alias for the destination node, the 
algorithm fails. 
Then we update the filter coverage accordingly.
 
For example when source is node 1:
 
Filter coverage for node 6 at link 1 is : {A" A2}
 
Filter coverage for node 12 at link 1 is: {A7, ALO}
 
Filter coverage for node 12 at link 2 is: {3,4, 8}
 
Here, Al is an alias for node 1. Both can be used to denote node 1.
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Let s be the source node. Initially PAis {s} for the source node sand {I ,2, ... ,ex:} 
for the rest of the nodes. AI, A2, ... , An are the nodes in consideration in the initialization 
stage. So, for any node v except s, cardinality IPA(V) 1 = oc. 
Sweep Phase: 
Il u 
Pick any link (u,v) such that I(PACu) - (UF;,A(It)UD)UCUSCFI.I») 1>1 PA(v) 1and 
;=1 ;=1 
(Bandwidth(v) >= bandwidthRequired). 
PA(V) = PA+ v (where v is not a filter and not the destination). 
If no such link is available, the BFM algorithm terminates. At the tennination PA 
provides the s-t path. 
We provide an example of this algoritlun. in the next section. 
4.3.3 Traceback: 
Once tbe path is established any node (except the filters and destination) in the 
path can spoof. In this way the number ofnodes that can spoofdecreases. 
Equation: Suppose a is an attacking node. 
II 
a E (PA -CUFA + D) 
;=J 
n 
For UFA finds the number of filter for path PAand D is the destination. 
;=1 
4.4 Secure Distance Vector Algorithm: 
This algorithm finds a secure QoS path from a source to destination within a 
network. It follows the Distance Vector Algorithm to find the most secure path. The 
QoS metrics used are hops and bandwidth. Initially each node floods a hello packet 
throughout the network. A hello packet contains the node id, the number ofhops, 
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number ofregular nodes and the number of filters the packet has traversed till now. Any 
node receiving a hello packet updates the hop number, number of regular nodes and 
number of filters on the path; and fOlwards the packet to its incoming links. Though we 
assume that the user-defined network is uni-directional, the hello packets are allowed to 
traverse in the opposite direction. The following diagram displays the traversal path of 
hello packets initiated by node] 6. 
80:\1 
6 
Figure 4: Hello Packet travel path 
Upon receiving the hello packet, each node updates its forwarding table. A 
forwarding table contains information about a destination, next hop towards the 
destination and the total hops required to reach the destination, the number ofregular 
nodes on the path and the number of filters on the path. 
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Next is a forwarding table of source node 1 containing necessary information to 
send packets towards a destination. 
Destination Next Hop Hop Regular No. of filters 
nodes 
2 2 1 1 0 
3 {} 0 0 0 
4 f} 0 0 0 
5 5 1 I. 0 
6 2 2 2 0 
7 2 3 2 I. 
8 {} 0 0 0 
9 5 2 2 0 
10 2 3 2 I. 
10 5 3 3 0 
11 2 4 3 1 
12 2 5 4 1 
13 {} 0 0 0 
14 2 4 2 2 
14 5 4 3 I. 
15 2 4 2 2 
I15 5 5 4 1 
1.6 2 5 3 2 
1.6 5 5 4 I. 
Table I.: Forwarding Table for node I. 
The rest of the nodes also create its own forwardi,ng in similar fashion. 
We may have multiple entries for a destination in the forwarding of a node. This 
only means that there are multiple paths from this node towards the destination. In that 
case, a node will forward the packet to a neighbor based on bandwidth available and hops 
required. Also, it sends the packet to a neighbor through which it takes the minimum 
number of regular nodes and the maximum number of filters to traverse to reach the 
destination. If two or more paths have similar metrics, then a node chooses one of the 
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paths on a random decision. It has been mentioned earlier that each node is assumed to 
know about each of its outgoing links. 
Next we provide a flow diagram showing how a packet from a source node 
reaches the destination node. 
Source Node Sends Packet 
to a Desllnatlon 
Is the Intermediate 
node a filter? 
yes 
check filter 
coverage for the no 
source node 
Intermediate nodel 
filter checks 
Invalid packet no forwarding lable 
discard 
send to neighbor
 
node from forwarding
 
table with highest
 
bandwidth
 
with minimum hop.
 
minimum number of
 
regular nodes and
 
maximum numbar of
 
filters
 
Figure 5: Flow Diagram for Secure DVA 
The following section provides an example of this algorithm. 
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4.4.1 Denial of Service (DoS) Attack: 
DoS attack can occur if one or more nodes start spoofing on behalf of another 
node and start sending packets to a destination. lfthe attacking nodes are already in the 
filter coverage, the filters would not block the inflow ofpackets towards the destination. 
As a result, the bandwidth will be consumed on the particular links. Therefore, the 
network communication is highly likely to be freezed on those particular links. Important 
messages sent by other nodes will be dropped and fai I to reach the destination. If 
multiple node target a destination, then distributed denial of service attack will occur. 
Thus, the destination node may have to shut down its operation shortly because the 
incoming packets may overflow its queue. 
4.4.2 Traceback:
 
The problem is that we cannot pinpoint any specific attacker in the case of denial of
 
service attack. We just can make a prediction based on the filter coverage of the spoofed
 
node.
 
However, we are certain that the attackerls are members of the union of filter coverage
 
for the spoofed node.
 
Here, k is the source node. Sk(Fi,,j gets the filter coverage for filter i on link I for source 
node k. 
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Chapter 5
 
Implementation Approach
 
The protocols would be tested for several network systems. Visual C++.net 
would be used for the implementation purpose and the platfonn would be Windows 
98/20001XP. We assume that the user provides the network structure and the location of 
the filters. We consider that the links between nodes are uni-directional. An example of 
an input network is given below: 
Q-...-ep 
'5. 
",0 
..1" 
'r
12 ) 
0' • 
0 •• 
o 
0•• 
...-6 
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5.1 Protocol Design: 
5.1.1 Finding out neighbors: 
We assume that each node only keeps infonnation about its first degree neighbor . 
Initially each of the nodes forwarding table is empty. Each node sends hello packets to 
its incoming links. We assume that hello packets can be sent in the opposite direction. 
Each node updates its neighbor table after receiving the "hello" packets. 
A hello packet contains basic Infonnation about the sender node. Once receiving 
a hello packet, a node easily learns about the source. 
For example: 
Node 1 receives hello packets from node 2 and node 5. Thus node 2 and node 5 
notify node 1 about their presence.. Therefore, forwarding table for node I is: {2,5} 
hello packet 
hello 
peckel 
Figure 6: Neighbor Table Construction 
5.1.2 Finding out Filter Coverage for a node: 
At first the user selects the source node and the destination node. Initially the 
source node sends out control messages towards the filter. Each node receiving the 
control packet adds its node id to PA and then forwards it to its neighbor nodes. 
Let S(Fu) be the set of nodes covered by filter I on link I. 
30 
Initially S(Fu) is empty for all the filters. 
Once a filter receives PA. it updates its spoofable set for the source node. It takes 
non-filter nodes the nodes in PA after the last filter specified in PA. The filter sends 
control message containing PA to all its outgoing links. 
Once this is done, all the other nodes that were not included in PA sends out 
control messages with their node id. S(Fu) is updated after each filter receives PA from 
these nodes. 
We assume that the filter coverage same for both protocols. 
5.2 Secure Routing Protocol Based on BeUman-Ford-Moore Algorithm: 
5.2.1 Packet Fields: 
(Source id, PA, Destination id, cid, bandwidth Requirement) 
Here, cid is the job id. PAis the set of all nodes on path A. Initially the user 
specifies the bandwidth requirement for the connection. A node receiving a request 
checks for PA • If it is on the path, it discards the request as it finds a loop. 
The following is an example of this protocol where the source node is 1 and 
destination node 16 and Bandwidth required = 300. 
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Initial ization: 
Bandwidth required = 300 
600 
8 
lnitially SOUfce node A] hasPA= {I} and rest of the nodes has PA = {1,2 ... ,oc). 
Sweep 1: 
32 
Al sends packet to A z and A3. IPAI at Az and A3 is greater that {I}. So, Az updates PA to 
{1,2} and A3 updated PA to {1,5}. 
33 
Sweep 2: 
A2 sends packet to A6 (filter). As A6 is a filter PA remains unchanged at A6. 
Sweep 3: 
G(~~~ O-~-Y 
550 600 p. = 750 
~r~ (~;:~ (.) 
700 600 "" Y 
P.={1.5.9} I P.=e-} - ~ 
P ={} .. PI. -{} ""' 
A,j9 no~A,I~  ~JA,/12)A,/11 
(800 '1800 
G p.=oA\ p.. ={}600 :G- ~={} ~700 ,..,/15 900 ,..,/16 
34 
A 3 sends PA to As. IP AI at A3 = cx:, as a result at A3 PA becomes {I ,5,9} 
Sweep 4: 
800 
6 
A6 sends PA to A 7 (filter). PA remains unchanged at A7. 
Sweep 5: 
State unchanged 
As sends P A to A7. IPAI at As is 3, whereas IPAI at A7 is 5. So PA remains unchanged at 
35 
Sweep 6: 
P.. ={1,2) 
v~-<? O-~y
 
550 600 p .. = 750 $0115l (~;::~6.n 9 
700 600 750 
P.. ={1.5,9}P = ~ P .. =8- 85O~ 
.. {1,2..6,7,11 P = {} 
As/9 {1 ~6~1. '""\ .. ., / 
770 ,!~~ AJ11 800--.1 All/12) 
\ BOO ':1 
800 ~P"~_{}o 600PA={~ p.. ={} ~700 A,r/15 900 ~/16 
A6 sends PA to Ag. PA at Ag get updated to {1,2,7,lO} 
Sweep 7: 
P.. ={1} P,={1.2} 
q>-~-<? 0-'OOy 
550 600 p.. = 750 
0r'~ (~;::~.n ~ 
'00 600 ".C0- YP,=(1.5.9} \ 850 
AJ9 {1~6:? +"'\ p.. = {1,2,7,11} p.. = (~ ~ 
770 ,A,/10 A,f11 800-.1 Alll12) 
(800 ':10 
800 
8 Pzj=600 P _ {}{1.2~~1~,1~ {1,2,6\O,15 ~700 A,r/15 900 A,/16 
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A7 sends PA to A9 and Alo. PA gets updated for both the nodes. 
Sweep 8: 
9-~~2J &800y 
550 600 P = 750 
PA ={1.2.6.7}A \..... {,.~.61 ~'J1'~ (:r )-'W---7 9
700 600 750 
P =(1.5.9} I PA = P - 850 P = A 
.. (1.2.6.10) {1.2,6.;,11} ~.2.6,7,11.12) 
""--<:-/~~ A,/11 SOOJA,,/,,) 
\ 800 'l 
800 {1.2~~1~.1~ {1.2~~1~.1~ P =~ 
~700~900~8
A 
A II is a filter. Upon Receiving PA from As, AIl updates it PA to {I ,2,6,7,10} 
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Sweep 9: 
9-=~21 o-~y 
550 600 p = 750 ~r'5} (~~~6n 9
700 600 750 
P = (1 5 9} P = 850 P = 
A ., \ A ~ (1 A 
.. {1.2,6.10} ~.2.6.7.11.12} 
71O_{Y~~ 800--./:::,?AJ" 
\ 800 640 
6 
800 
P = AA 600 P =~ P{0-(} 
(1 ,2.6.10.1~{1.2.6.10.14.1
 
~700 A,r/15 900 A.!16 
A9 sends PA to AIO. IP AI at AJO is less than the received PA. PAis changed at AIQ. 
38 
Sweep 10: 
PA ={1} PA ={1.2} 
0-8007~~ -« 
550 600 PI. = 750 $~{1'5} (~;:::~2o.n 
700 600 750 B50 P _ 
PA = {1.5.9} \ PI. = P = 1.-
" {1 .2,6.1 O} {1.2,~.7.11} ~.2,6.7.11.12} 
BOO----.l'A11/12j770~/~~ 
'1 
\ BOO 640 PI. = 
600 1,2.6,10,14.15 
,16}{1.2.6~10,14P=G-
AJ14 700 
AIO sends PA to destination A12• AI2 updates its PA to {l,2,6,IO,14,15,I6}. 
Sweep II: 
State unchanged. 
All sends PA to A 12. But PA sent by All can have 4 attacking nodes on its path whereas 
the current PA at A12 can have 6 attacking nodes on its path. So, PA remains unchanged at 
Thus, the path from node 1 to 16 is {I, 2, 6, 10, 14,15, I6} which is the most secured 
path available according to secure BFM. 
Ifnecessary, a hop constraint can be added. 
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The destination sends back confinnation to reserve the path based on PA. While we 
reserve, each node on the path updates its bandwidth available. When done each node on 
the path releases the bandwidth. 
5.2.2 Path reservation: 
Reservation of the path PA starts from the destination in the reverse order. For 
each link the bandwidth is reserved for the particular job. The reserved bandwidth is 
released once infonnation transfer is tenninated. The following diagrams describe the 
reservation procedure. 
Step 1: 
o
I •• 
\ 
40 
Step 2: 
0-000 
6 
800 
Figure 7: Reservation of a path 
5.2.3 Traceback: 
Once the path is established any node (except the filters and destination) in the 
path can spoof. In this way the number of nodes that can spoof decreases. Suppose: for 
the path 1-2-6-10-15-16 (as per example) 
n, 
PA = {1,2,6,10,15,16}, UFA = {6,10} and D = 16. 
1=1 
n 
From the equation, a E (PA - (UFA +D) , we find that 'a' can be a member of 
;=1 
the set {I ,2,15}. That means, only nodes 1,2 and 15 can spoof on behalf of node 1 on 
this path. 
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5.3 Secure Routing Protocol Based on Distance Vector Algorithm: 
5.3.1 Packet Field: 
(source id, destination id, Bandwidth Requirement) 
Here, bandwidth requirement refers to th°e bandwidth requirement for sending a 
packet on a link. As we can see, the bandwidth decreases with each packet on the 
network and bandwidth is released once the packet reaches the neighboring node. 
Filter coverage is the same as the proposed algorithm based on the BFM 
algorithm covered earlier in this paper. 
The following is an example to find a path from source node 1 to destination node 
16. We use the proposed protocol based on Distance Vector Algorithm to find the path. 
The network being used is user-defined. 
User-defined Network: Bandwidth required = 300. 
700 
>-__770 
6 
800 
42 
700 
Initial network with numbered nodes and labeled bandwidth on each link. 
L--_- 770 
6 
800 
Bandwidth on (l,2) is 200 which is less that 300. So, the Packet is sent on the path from 
node 1 to 5. Bandwidth is reduced from 550 to 250. 
43 
Step 2: 
400 
o 
800 
Packet reaches node 5. Bandwidth is returned to link (1,5). 
44 
Step 3: 
From node 9 the forwarding node to go to destination 16 is node 10 which is a filter. 
Bandwidth is reduced to 470. Filter 10 checks the validity of the packet. It receives the 
packet on its link 1, which is a valid path for source node 1. Bandwidth is returned to the 
link (9,10). 
Step 4: 
.y--ep o---y
J 7~ 
(
,/.",.~~'I 
\ 750
~ 1 ~0006-
to \ 000-1 ~ 'J11¢- --( J""" \.• 770 1 r000 
6 6-~ 
45 
From node 10 the forwarding node is node 15 to reach destination. The link. (10,15) has 
enough bandwidth to support the packet transfer. So the packet is sent to node 15. 
Bandwidth is reduced to 500 while packet is on the link. 
Step 5: 
6 
100 
Bandwidth is returned to the Unk (10,15). Node 15 forwards packet to the de tination. 
46 
100 
Step 6: 
0--
L.--_- l1O 
o 
800 
Packet reaches destination node 16. 
In Step 1, node 1 sends packet to node 5 instead of node 2. The reason behind is 
that the link between node 1 and 2 has bandwidth less than 300. It is clear that node 2 
would have been chosen if there were enough bandwidth available between node 1 and 
node 2. 
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Chapter 6 
Simulation Results and Analysis 
Network topologies were generated using the BRITE Topology Generation Tool 
[17]. A hundred simulations were performed in each category and the average taken. 
Networks with 20 nodes, 40 nodes, 60 nodes, and 80 nodes were generated using BRITE. 
To generate a network, Waxman's probability model [18] for interconnecting the nodes 
of the topology was used. The model is given by: 
P(u. v) = ae-dl(fJL) 
Where 0 < a, f3 <= 1, d is the Euclidean distance from node u to node v, and L is 
the maximum distance between any two nodes. 
For each network, 4 kinds of simulations were done. 
1. Best Placement Low Density 
2. Best Placement High Density 
3. Random Placement Low Density 
4. Random Placement High Density 
At low density, only 10% of all nodes are filters. 20% of all filters are considered 
filters at high density. In the case ofbest filter placement strategy, the filters were placed 
strategically at nodes with the maximum input and output links. In random filter 
placement strategy, the filters were placed in a random manner. 
For each edge, bandwidth capacity was generated with a random distribution 
between 10 and 1024. 
48 
First we have a look at Figure 8(a) for 20-node network in the case ofbest filter 
placement low density. 2 (10% of 20) nodes were assigned as filters because oflow 
density filter placement. The secure DVA performs the best among all the algorithms. It 
Best Placement Low Density Best Placement High Density 
4.5 
4 
2.5 
~ 
2 3.5 ~ 3 
X' T! 1.5 f 25 
..".. J:z: 2 
it  /-. ....-1 1.5 
.-1 
0.5 rI0.5
o •.P'" 
a o 4 6 8 10 12 14 
0 4 6 8 10 12 14 Filter. 
H.opt!I__BFM_OVA Secured OVA --*"""Seeured BFM I I--BFM -4-DVA Secured OVA --*"""Secured BFM I 
(a) (b) 
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Fihrure 8: Security on 20-node network 
finds more filters on paths ofshorter lengths. There seems to be only three graphs 
because BFM and DVA generated the same results. We can see that secure BFM 
performs fairly well. It generates longer paths than secure DVA and also there is a 
graduate increase in filter quantity in terms of path length. Equation 1 (page 23) doesn't 
find the path with maximum filters on some occasions. The Equation depends on the 
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filter coverages. And we may get higher filter coverage for lesser number of filters due 
to the randomness of the network. That's why, secure BFM doesn't reach the 2 filter 
mark. We can see hikes on secure DVA, BFM and OVA because of randomly selected 
paths. 
Next, we look at Figure 8(b) for a 20-node network with best filter placement at 
high density. 4 (20% of 20) nodes were assigned as filters because of high density filter 
placement. The secure DVA performs best among all the algorithms. The secure BFM 
finds longer paths but performs in a consistent manner. BFM and DVA find the shortest 
paths and also finds less filters on various paths compared to secure DVA and secure 
BFM. Secure DVA finds more filters on shorter paths. Whereas the performance of 
secure BFM depends on the random behavior of Equation 1 (page 23). That's why it 
finds close to maximum filters on some occasions. 
Now, lets consider Figure 8(c) for a 20-node network with random filter 
placement at low density. 2 (10% of20) nodes were randomly assigned as filter because 
of low density filter placement. The graphs indicate that the number of filters in the path 
increases with the path length upto a certain point. Below this optimum point, the 
number of filter in a path decreases even as the path length increases. This is particularly 
true of the secure DVA algorithm. Secure DVA performs quite well but falters at the 
end. The sharp drops in secure OVA and DVA are seen because of randomly selected 
paths. However, future work is required to contion this. Moreover the secure BFM 
performs well for longer paths. This happens due to the random behavior of Equation 1 
(page 23). Equation 1 indicates that paths oflonger hops with more filters in them will 
be generated for secure BFM. 
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Now, we consider Figure 8(d) for a 20-node network with random filter 
placement at high density. 4 (20% of20) nodes were randomly assigned as filters 
because of high density filter placement. We see a sharp drop at the end for the secure 
DVA. We see this sharp drop because of randomly selected paths and also the filters 
were placed randomly. Further research is needed to confirm this. Secure BFM does 
fairly well for longer paths. The BFM and DVA perform in a consistent manner. They 
find the shortest path between two nodes. And the filters found on each path depend on 
the randomness of this filter placement strategy. These results indicate that for long 
paths, secure BFM is the preferred choice, whereas for short and medium paths, secure 
DVA provides better security. 
Next, we consider Figure 9(a) for a 40-node network with best filter placement at 
low density. The secure DVA performs best among all the algorithms. This 
Best Placement low Density Best Placement High Density 
4.5 9 
-- 8 
-'" 
L .;,£"~3.5 
-
...... ~ .I"~ "'"7\3 6 ~ .~.i 2.5 1!5/C ..;ril: 2 ~4
.r1.5 
~ .... ....
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2 
0.5 II -::do .-
o .H o 
o 5 10 15 20 o 15 2510 20 
Hops 
I-+-BFM __OVA Secured OVA -"-'Secured BFM I Secured OVA -"-'Secu'ed BFM I 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 9: Security on 40-node network 
happens because secure DVA tries to reduce the number of regular nodes and at the same 
time increase the number of filters. As a result, it produces shorter paths with more filters 
compared to secure BFM. Secure BFM also performs pretty well. Because of Equation 
1 (page 23) it produces larger hops for secure BFM but on some occasions it does not 
find the maximum number of filters on a path. Again, as expected, the DVA and BFM 
find shortest paths amongst the algorithms. We see a sudden drop in the number of filters 
for these algorithms at hop 8. This happens because the paths were selected randomly. 
Figure 9(b) is considered for a 40-node network in the case of best filter 
placement at high density. The performance of the algorithms is very similar to Figure 
9(a). Because ofhigh density filter placement, 8 (20% of40) nodes were assigned as 
filters. For longer hops it is noticeable that Secure DVA and Secure DVA fmd more 
filters on a path compared to DVA and BFM. 
Next, we look at Figure 9(c) for a 40-node network with random filter placement 
at low density. 4 (10% of 40) nodes were randomly assigned as filters. Secure DVA 
starts off doing quite well. But we see a sharp drop after hop 12 because of randomly 
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positioned filters within the network. This effect has been noticed with smaller and 
larger networks and is an area for future research. Secure BFM does better than the DVA 
and BFM. We also see a few drops and hikes on secure BFM because of randomly 
selected paths. BFM and DVA find the shortest paths with fewer filters among the 
algorithms. 
Now, lets look at Figure 9(d) for a 40-node network in the case of random filter 
placement at high density. 8 (20% of40) nodes were randomly assigned as filters. 
Secure DVA perfonns the best among all the algorithms. Secure BFM produces longer 
hops compared. to secure DVA. Due to Equation 1 (page 23) it does not find the 
maximum filters on its paths. The sharp drops and hikes on secure DVA and secure 
DVA are due to the random selection ofpaths. We see slight difference in BFM and 
DVA because of the filters was selected. randomly for each of the algorithms. 
Next, we look at Figure I O(a) for a 60-node network with best filter placement at 
low density. In this figure secure DVA perfonns the best among all the algorithms. 
Secure DVA generates shorter paths with more filters on each path. On the 
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Figure 10: Security on 60-node network 
other hand, secure BFM produces longer paths with fairly good amount of filters on each 
path. It happens because of Equation 1 (page 23). The DVA and BFM finds shortest 
path with fewer filters on each path. The hikes and drops in secure DVA, DVA and BFM 
happen due to the randomness of the paths. 
Figure 10(b) is shown for a 60-node network in the case of best filter placement at 
high density. 12 (20% of 60) nodes were assigned as filters. We see almost the same 
picture as Figure 10(a) with more filters on each path because of high density filter 
placement. 
Now, we look at Figure 10(c) for a 60-node network with random filter placement 
at low density. 6 (10% of 60) nodes were randomly placed as filters. Secure DVA starts 
performing quite well but has a sharp drop at the end. This happens due to randomly 
placed filters. Secure BFM perfonns worst. We see some hikes and drops in the case of 
secure BFM. This happens because of randomly selected paths and randomly positioned 
filters. The DVA and BFM falls in between secure DVA and secure BFM at the end. 
DVA and BFM find the shortest paths. 
54 
Next, we consider Figure tOed) for a 60-node network in the case of random filter 
placement at high density_ 12 (10% of60) nodes were randomly assigned as filters. 
Secure DVA performed the best among all the algorithms. Secure BFM performed 
gradually but its performed dropped at the end. It happened due to randomness of 
Equation 1 (page 23). The DVA and BFM found the shortest paths between any two 
nodes but with fewer filters on each path. 
Figure I 1(a) shows the graph for an 80-node network with best filter placement at 
low density. 8 (10% of 80) nodes were assigned as filters. The performance of secure 
DVA is shown to be the best. Secure DVA reduces the number of regular nodes and also 
tries to increase the number of filters on a particular path. Therefore, it generates shorter 
paths with more filters. Secure BFM also performed well. It found longer paths because 
of Equation t (page 23). It found a good quantity of filters on its paths. The DVA and 
BFM found the shortest paths with fewer filters on the paths. 
Now we look at Figure It(b) for an 80-node network in the case of best filter 
placement at high density. 16 (20% of 80) nodes were assigned as filters in thi ca e. 
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Figure 11: Security on 80-node network 
The perfonnance of DVA was still the best. It found the shorter paths with more filters 
on the paths. Secure BFM found longer paths with a good amount of filters between two 
nodes. We see a drop for secure BFM because ofthe randomness in Equation 1 (page 
23). The DVA and BFM found the shortest paths. These paths had fewer filters in them. 
Lets look at Figure I I (c) for an 80-node network in the case of random filter 
placement at low density. 8 (10% of 80) nodes were randomly assigned as filters. Secure 
DVA perfonns best among all the algorithms. Secure BFM doesn't do well till hop 28. 
After that we see some hikes on secure BFM. This happens due to the randomness of 
Equation I (page 23). The BFM and DVA find the shortest paths among all the 
algorithms. We see a hike of BFM due to randomly selected paths. 
Now, we look at Figure 11(d) for an 80-node network with random filter 
placement at high density. 16 (20% of 80) nodes were randomly assigned as filters. 
Secure DVA again perfonned well. We see a better perfonnance of secure BFM 
compared to Figure 11(c). This happens because there are more :filters within the 
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network now. Equation 1 (page 23) produces larger paths. And on larger paths we see a 
better performance in terms of filters in the case of Secure BFM. The DVA and BFM 
fmd the shortest paths. We see a hike on DVA due to randomly selected paths. 
The following main conclusion can be drawn from these simulations: 
• As expected, the shortest routes are obtained using the standard BFM and DVA 
• Again as expected the best placement strategy produced more secure routes than a 
random placement strategy 
• Simulations show the superiority of the secure DVA over the secure BFM 
algorithm. 
• An unexpected result is the degradation in performance of the secure DVA as the 
number of nodes in the network exceeds a certain threshold. In other words, there 
is an optimum path length at which the number of filters in the path is a 
maximum. Above this length, the number of filters in the path decreases. But as 
the number ofnodes in a network increase, secure DVA tends to overcome this 
behavior. Further research is needed to define the 'optimum' point when the 
number of filters in the path is a maximum. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
In tbis paper we have proposed secure QoS routing algorithms for dynamic, 
routing and resource reservation. The paths gt-'Ilerated by these algorithms are longer 
than those generated by non-secure algorithms. The secure Distance Vector Algorithm 
provides shorter paths and better security than the secure Bellman-Ford-Moore algorithm. 
That is, the path generated by the secure DVA passes through more filters, thus reducing 
the scope for spoofing. We get more secure paths using best filter placement with high 
density. Further work is needed to determine the optimal distribution of filters in the 
network. Future work will also investigate secure routing satisfying multiple QoS 
requirements. 
.. 
This work may be extended to investigate IP traceback to determine the probable 
locations of the attackers. A rea] system is more desired to carryon the test. Also, 
experiments should involve as many nodes as possible. 
However, in summary we believe that the se,cure QoS routing algorithms can 
significantly reduce the Denial of Service attacks. 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY 
Node: In a network, a node is a connection point, either a redistribution point or an end 
point for data transmissions. In genera], a node has programmed or engineered capability 
to recognize and process or forward transmissions to other nodes. 
Spoof: To deceive for the purpose of gaining access to someone else's resources (tor 
example, to fake an Internet address so that one looks like a certain kind of Internet user) 
Bandwidth: Bandwidth (the width ofa band ofelectromagnetic frequencies) is used to 
mean (1) how fast data flows on a given transmission path, and (2), somewhat more 
technically, the width of the range of frequencies that an electronic signal occupies on a 
given transmission medium.. 
Hop: One hop is defined as the transit through one router. Each router always adds 1 to 
account for itself. 
ICMP: Short for Internet Control Message Protocol, an extension to the Internet Protocol 
(IP). ICMP supports packets containing error, control, and informational messages. The 
PING command, for example, uses ICMP to test an Internet connection. 
Ping: A utility that detennines whether a specific IP address is accessible. It works by 
sending a packet to the specified address and waiting for a reply. PING is used primarily 
to troubleshoot Internet connections. 
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APPENDlXB 
IMPLEMENTATION 
IIMunirul Islam 
Ilosu ID# 440-15-5382 
IIThesis 
1***********************************************************1 
II project.cpp 
#include <iostream.h> 
#include <iomanip.h> 
#include <fstream.h> 
#include <windows.h> 
#include "nodes.h" 
#include "statistics.h" 
const char STRATEGIES[] [80]= 
{ 
"Best placement, low density", 
"Best placement, high density", 
"Random placement, low density", 
"Random placement, high density", 
"Incremental placement, low density", 
"Incremental placement, high density" 
const char ALGORITHMS[] [80]= 
{ 
"Print all paths", 
"Bellman-Ford-Moore Algorithm", 
"Distance Vector Algorithm", 
"Secure Distance Vector Algorithm", 
"Secure Bellman Ford Moore Algorith" 
} ; 
struct setup 
{ 
int placement_type; 
int path_strategy; 
float bandwidth; 
} ; 
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void eatFile(const char* fileName, ofstream& report, 
~eA@i8E~e~§e8Ea@JCe@@~p~h8etu~,~k,ofstream& report, 
Statistics& stat, setup& setup); 
int main(int argc, char**argv} 
{ 
if(argc!=3} 
{ 
cout «"Syntax: "«argv [0] «" path\ \mask* .brit.e 
report_file\n\n"; 
return 1; 
} 
ofstream report(argv[2]); 
if (! report) 
{ 
cout «"Can't open report file "«argv[2] «endl; 
return 1; 
setup setup; 
/* placement stuff */ 
cout « "\nSpecify strategy for placement of the 
filters: \n"; 
cout « "1. Best placement, low density\n"; 
cout « "2. Best placement, high density\n"; 
cout « "3. Random placement, low density\n"; 
cout « "4. Random placement, high density\n"; 
cout « "5. Incremental placement, low density\n"; 
cout « "6. Incremental placement, high density\n"; 
/* read placement type (repeat until user made co rect 
selection) */ 
int placement_type; 
cin »placement_typei 
while(placement type<l I I placement_type>6}{ -
cout «"Value of "«placement_type«" is incorrect choice. 
Retype: "; 
cin »placement_type; 
} 
setup.placement_type = placement_typei 
report «"Placement type: "« STRATEGIES[placement_type-
1] «endli 
/* read path selection strategy./ 
cout « "\nSpecify path selection strategy:\n"i 
cout « "b) Bellman-Ford-Moore Algorithm\n"i 
cout « "c) Distance Vector Algorithm\n"j 
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cout « "e) secure Bellman Ford Moore Algorith \n"; 
E§~~ m~nli~te!@E~f@nl?istanceVector Algorithm\n"; 
char *Pi 
do 
{ 
cin »menu selection; 
while(cin.get(} !='\n')  
p=strchr ("BeDE", toupper(menu_selection» ; 
if (p==NULL) 
{ 
cout «"Wrong selection. Retype: " ,.
} 
} 
while (p==NULL) ; 
static const char menumap[]={l,2,2,3,4}; 
report «"Algorithm: "« ALGORITHMS[toupper(menu_selection)-
'A'] «endl; 
setup.path_strategy=menumap[toupper(menu_selection)-'A'] ; 
cout «"Ender minimum bandwidth: ";  
cin » setup.bandwidth; 
report «"minimum bandwidth: "« setup.bandwidth«end1i 
report «"files selected: n« argv[l] «endl;  
report «endl«endl; 
report 
«"*************************************************** ***\n\n" 
Statistics stat;  
applySearch(argv[l] , report, stat, setup); 
return 0; 
} 
void applySearch(const char* mask, ofstream& report,  
Statistics& stat, setup& setup) 
{ 
WIN32_FIND_DATA FileData; II Data structure describes the 
file found 
HANDLE hSearch; II Search handle returned by 
FindFirstFile 
BOOL bFinished = FALSE; 
hSearch FindFirstFile( mask, &FileData); 
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cerr «"No files n«mask«" fOWld\n"j 
i f r~@.e.~ftfch INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) 
} 
char *fileDirEnd=strrchr(mask, ,\\.} j 
const char *fileDiri  
if (fileDirEnd) 
{ 
* (++fileDirEnd}=Oi 
fileDir=maskj 
} 
else 
fileDir=""; 
while (! bFinished) 
{ 
char *fullFileName=new 
char [strlen(fileDir} +strlen (FileData.cFileName) +1] ; 
strcpy(fullFileName, fileDir}; 
strcat(fullFileName, FileData.cFileName}; 
eatFile(fullFileName, report, stat" setup}; 
delete[] fullFileNamej 
if (!FindNextFile (hSearch, &FileData)} 
{ 
bFinished = TRUE; 
if (GetLastError () 
{ 
cerr «"Unable to find next file within "«mask«endl; 
} 
II Close the search handle. 
if (!FindClose (hSearch») 
{ 
cerr « "Unable to close search handle.\n"; 
} 
stat.calculateGlobalStat() ; 
report«"\n\n\nRESULTS\n------------------------------\n\n"j 
stat.reportGlobalStat(report)j 
report.flush() ; 
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void eatFile(const char* fileName, ofstream& report, 
Statistics& stat, setup& setup) 
{ 
Nodes nodes; 
if(lnodes.loadNodes(fileName» 
{ 
report«fileNarne«" : cannot be loaded (check file 
syntax) \n" ; 
return ; 
cout «"Analyzing "«fileName«" ... "«endl;  
nodes.placeFilters(setup.placement_type) ; 
int start, end; 
stat.startNetwork() ; 
for (start=O; start<nodes.node number; start++){ -
if (start) cout «"\b\b\b\b"; 
cout «setw(3)«lOO*start/(nodes.node_number-l)«"t"; 
cout.flush() ; 
if (nodes.nodes [start] .isFilter(» continue; 
for(end=O; end<nodes.node number; end++){ -
if (start==end II nodes . nodes [end] . isFilter () continue; 
//guaranteed start!=end, and both are non-filters 
Path path=nodes.findpath(start, end, 
setup.path_strategy, setup.bandwidth,NULL); 
if(path.exists(» 
{ 
stat.addPath(path) ; 
} 
cout«endl;  
stat.finishNetwork() ; 
report«fileNarne«endl;  
stat.reportNetwork(report) ; 
report.flush() ; 
} 
/***********************************************************/ 
II node.h 
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#ifndef NODE H 
#define NODE H 
class node 
private: 
int node id; 
double x,y; 
bool filter; 
int in_neighbore[50]; 
int in_neighbor_countj 
int out_neighbors [50] ; 
int out_neighbor_counti 
double bandwidth [50] ; 
double distance [50] ; 
public: 
node (void) i II Default constructor. 
node(int,double,doubleli II Constructor 
-node (void) i II Destructor 
void setFilter{void) i 
void clearFilter() {filter=false;} 
bool isFilter{void) const {return filter;} 
int get_in_neighbor_count(void) consti 
int get_out_neigbbor_count{void) const; 
void set_in_neigbor(int) ; 
void set_out_neighbor(int,double, double) i 
void operator=(const node&); 
friend class Paths; 
friend class Pathi 
}; 
#endif 
1*************************************;*********************1 
II node.cpp 
#include "node.h" 
#include <iostream.h> 
11--------------------------------
II node methods 
11--------------------------------
node: : node (void) { 
node id = -100i 
x Oi 
Y = Oi 
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int i;  
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
filterifi_~el§KDors[i] = -100; 
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
out_neighbors[i] = -100; 
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
{ 
bandwidth[i] = -100; 
distance[i] -100; 
} 
in_neighbor_count 0; 
out_neighbor_count = 0; 
node::node(int id,double x_coordinate,double y_coordinate) { 
node_id = id; 
x = x_coordinate; 
y = y_coordinate; 
filter = false; 
int i;  
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
in_neighbors[i] = -100; 
for (i=0;i<50;i++l 
out_neighbors[il = -100; 
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
{ 
bandwidth [i] = -100; 
distance[i] -100; 
} 
in_neighbor_count 0; 
out_neighbor_count = 0; 
node: : -node (void) 
} 
void node: :setFilter(void) 
filter = true; 
} 
int node: :get_in_neighbor_count(void) const { 
return in_neighbor_count; 
int node::get_out_neighbor_count(void) const { 
return out_neighbor_count; 
void node: :operator=(const node& p) 
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node id = p.node_id; 
x = p.x; 
Y = p·Yi 
filter = false; 
int i;  
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
in_neighbors[i] = -100; 
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
out_neighbors[i] = -100; 
for (i=0;i<50;i++) 
{ 
bandwidth[i] = -100; 
distance[i] -lOOi 
} 
in_neighbor_count 0; 
out_neighbor_count = 0; 
void node::set_in_neigbor(int i) 
{ 
in_neighbors [in_neighbor_countl i·, 
in_neighbor_count++; 
void node::set_out_neighbor(int i,double bwidth, double diet) 
{ 
out_neighbors [out_neighbor_count] = i; 
bandwidth [out_neighbor_count] = bwidth; 
distance[out_neighbor_count]=dist; 
out_neighbor_count++i 
I***********************************************~***********1 
II nodes.h 
#ifndef NODES H 
#define NODES H 
#include "node.h" 
#include "paths.h" 
struct Nodes 
{ 
node *nodes; 
int *nodeyos; 
int node_number; 
Nodes(): node_number (0) , nodes(NULL),nodeyos(NULL) {}; 
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bool loadNodes(const char *fileName); 
int placeFilters{int strategy); 
~R~ln~P2'~~~s~~~st {return node_number>O;} 
void showCovers(int start, void{* callback) (int, bool*»; 
Path findPath(int start, int final, int algorithm, float 
bandwidth, void(* callback) (Path&»); 
} ; 
#endif 
/***********************************************************/ 
I I nodes. cpp 
#include <fstream.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <time.h> 
#include "nodes.h" 
bool Nodes: :loadNodes(const char *fileName) 
{ 
char line[lOO]; 
if (nodes) delete[] nodes; 
nodes=NULL; 
if (node-pos) delete[] node-pos; 
node-pos=NULL; 
ifstream in (fileName) ; 
if (! in) 
{ 
return false; 
} 
node number = 0; 
int i = 0, edge_number = 0, nodeNumber 0; 
double x axis = 0, y axis = 0; 
in.getli;e(line,lOO); 
char *temp = strtok(line, II \t\n() , II);  
II read number of nodes 
temp = strtok(NULL," \t\n(),II);  
node_number = atoi{temp); 
nodes=new node [node_number] ; 
temp strtok(NULL," \t\n(), II);  
temp strtok(NULL, n \t\n(), II);  
edge_number = atoi(temp); 
in.getline{line,lOO) ; 
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in.getline(line,lOO) ; 
a8aB~~1~mMA!~~~SlOO) ; 
matrix=new double* [node_number] ; 
int **adj,**path; 
adj = new int*[node_number];  
path = new int*[node_number];  
for (i=O;i<node_number;i++) 
{ 
matrix[i]=new double [node_number] ; 
adj [i] = new int[node_number];  
path[i] = new int[node_number];  
for (int j=O;j <node_number; j++) 
{ 
matrix[i] [j] = 0; 
adj [i] [j] = 0; 
path[i] [j] = 0; 
} 
II network topology info processing 
II while (!in.eof(» 
{ 
for (i=O;i<node number;i++)( -
in.getline(line,lOO) ; 
char* temp = strtok(line," \t\n"); 
char* num = new char[lO]; 
strcpy(num,temp); 
nodeNumber = atoi(num); 
temp = strtok(NULL," \t\n l1 ); 
strcpy (num, temp) ; 
x axis = double (atof(num»; 
t~mp = strtok(NULL," \t\n"); 
strcpy(num,temp) ; 
y_axis = double (atof(num»; 
long oldFlag = cout.setf(ios: :fixed,ios::floatfield); 
long oldPrec = cout.precision(2); 
Ilcout « nodeNumber « " " « X axis « " «It 
y_axis « "\n"; -
cout.setf(oldFlag, ios::floatfield); 
cout.precision(oldPrec); 
node aNode(nodeNumber,x axis,y axis); 
nodes [i] = aNode; - -
} 
cout.flush() ; 
do 
{ 
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} 
while (strcmp(line, 1111)==0) ; 
fori~ig~~l~~~g~ifl~Q9}i++) { -
in.getline(line,lOO) ; 
char* temp = strtok(line," \t\n"); 
int from = 0, to = 0; 
double bw = 0, distj 
temp strtok(NULL," \t\n"); 
from atoi(temp) j 
temp strtok(NULL," \t\n") i 
to = atoi (temp) i 
nodes [to] .set in neigbor(from); 
temp = strtok{NULL,1I \t\n"); 
dist=(double} atof(temp); 
temp = strtok(NULL," \t\n"); 
temp = strtok (NULL, II \ t \n II) ; 
bw = (double) atof(temp) i 
matrix[from] [to] = bw; 
adj [from] [to] = 1; 
nodes [fromJ . set_out_neighbor(to,bw, dist) i 
Ilcout « from « II « to « II « bw « "\n";II II 
} 
II filter placement 
nodeyos = new int[node_nurnber] i 
int *neighborCount = new int[node_number] j 
for (i=O;i<node_nurnber;i++) 
nodeyos[i] = ii 
for (i=O;i<node_nurnber;i++) 
neighborCount[i] = nodes[i] .get in neighbor count() + 
nodes [i] .get_out_neighbor_count () ; - - . -
II bubble sort 
for (i=Oj i<node_nurnber-l; iTT) { 
for (int j=Oj j<node_nurnber-l-i; j++) 
if (neighborCount[j] < neighborCount[j+l]) 1* 
compare the two neighbors *1 
int tmp = neighborCount[j] j 1* swap a[jl and 
a[j+l1 *1 
neighborCount[j] = neighborCountrj+l]; 
neighborCount[j+l] = tmp; 
tmp = nodeyos[j] j 
nodeyos[j] = nodeyos[j+ll; 
nodeyos[j+l] = tmpj 
} 
for (i=Oii<node_nurnberji++) 
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delete[] matrix[i] 
delete[] matrix; 
delete [] adj i 
delete[] path; 
return true; 
} 
int Nodes: :placeFilters(int placement_type) 
{ 
int 
placement_nodes=(int) (node_number*(placement_type%2==1?O.1:0.2 
»; 
int period=node_number/placement_nodes; 
int position=period-l;  
int ii  
for(i=Oi 
{ 
nodes[i] .clearFilter();  
} 
/* randomize pseudo random numbers generator */ 
srand(time(NULL» i 
/* perform placement strategy */ 
int really-placed=O; 
for(i=Oi i<placement_nodesi i++) 
{ 
if(placement type<=2) /*if best placement*/{ -
/* just put filter to the nodes with most neighbors 
count *1 
nodes [node-pos [i]] .setFilter(); 
really-placed++; 
} 
else if(placernent type<=4) 1* random */{ -
int position; 
II don't put flter flag twice: repeat trying until we 
found a non-filter 
do 
{ 
position=rand()%node_numberi 
} 
while (nodes [position] .isFilter(») i 
73 
nodes [positiGn] .setFilter();  
reallyylaced++;} Ilplace filter to the position found 
else if(placement_type<=6) 1* incremental*1 
{ 
if(position != node number-l) 1* not last node*1{ -
nodes [poaition] .setFilter(); 
position+=period; 
reallyylaced++; 
} 
return reallyylaced; 
Path Nodes: :findPath(int start, int final, int algorithm, 
float bandwidth, void(* callback) (Path&» 
{ 
Paths paths (nodes, node_number, 0) i 
1* set path strategy for Paths object *1 
paths.setStrategy(algorithm) ; 
1* set bandwidth for Paths object *1 
paths.setBandwidth(bandwidth);  
1* run path selection algorithm*1 
if (algorithrn>l) 
{ 
Path bestPath=paths.findyaths(start, final); 
if (callback) callback(bestPath); 
return bestPath; 
} 
else 
{ 
paths.setCallback(callback) i 
return paths.findyaths(start, final) i 
int Nodes::nurnFilters() 
{ 
int result=Oi 
int ii  
for(i=Oi i<node number; i++){ -
if(nodes[i] .isFilter(» result++i 
} 
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voiaeN~~@S~~§H6w€overs(int start, void(* callback) (int,  
bool*) ) 
{ 
int i, j;  
bool *nodeCovered=new bool[node_number];  
for(i=O; i<node_number; i++) 
if (nodes [i] .isFilter(» 
{ 
for(j=O; j<node_number; j++) nodeCovered{j]=false; 
nodeCovered[start]=true; 
Path path(nodes, node_number);  
path.markFilterCover(i, nodeCovered); 
nodeCovered[start]=false; 
callback (i, nodeCovered); 
} 
delete[] nodeCovered; 
1***********************************************************1 
II paths.h 
#ifndef PATH H 
#define PATH H 
#include "node.h" 
Ilpath contains directed path 
class Path 
{ 
node* nodes; 
int count;  
int* path; 
int path_length; 
double path_distance; 
int count_filters;  
int securityMeasure; 
double edge_distance(int v, int w); 
void recalcSecurityMeasure() i 
public: 
Path () ; 
Path(node* nodes, int count); 
Path(const Path&) ; 
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bool is_in-path(int vertex) ; 
~g~ahAdG_vertex(int vertex) ; 
void delete_from_end();  
void print();  
double getDistance() const {return path_distance;} 
int getFiltersCount() const {return count_filters;} 
int getLengthO const {return path_length;} 
bool exists() {return path_length>=2;} 
Path& operator=(const Path& rhsl;  
int getItem(int index) {return path [index] ;} 
int getSecurityMeasure() ; 
void markFilterCover(int vertex, bool *nodeMeasuredl; 
}; 
class Paths 
{ 
node* nodes; 
int* visited from; 
int count; 
bool assume_unidirectional; 
int strategy; 
double bandwidth; 
Path minimumPath; 
void(* cb) (Path&) ; 
void find-path_between(int start, int finish, Path& 
partial-path ); 
public: 
Paths(node* nodes, int count, bool assume_unidirectional); 
-Paths() ; 
void setBandwidth(double bwidth) {bandwidth=bwidth;}; 
void setStrategy(int strat) {strategy=strat;}; 
void setCallback(void(* callback) (Path&» {cb=callback;} 
Path find-paths(int start, int finish); 
}; 
#endif 
j***********************************************************j 
II paths.cpp 
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#include <iostream.h> 
#include "paths.h" 
11--------------------------------
II paths methods 
11--------------------------------
Path::Path{node* nodes, int count): 
nodes (nodes) , count{count), path_length(Ol I 
path_distance{O.O), count_filters{O), 
securityMeasure{-l) 
{ 
path=new int[count] i 
} i 
Path: : Path () : 
nodes{NULL), count (0) , path_length{O), path distance{O.O), 
path (NULL) , count_filters{O), 
securityMeasure{-l) 
{ 
} ; 
1* copy constructor: required when re use path in return from 
the function*1 
Path: : Path (const Path& rhs): path (NULL) 
{ 
*this=rhsi 
} 
Path: : -Path () 
{ 
delete [] path; 
} 
1* copy operator: copies path from rhs to this *1 
Path& Path: :operator=(const Path& rhs) 
( 
if (this==&rhs) return *this; 
1* make sure to free current path if it's not NULL*I 
if (path) delete[] path; 
count=rhs. count;  
nodes=rhs.nodesi 
path_length=rhs.path_length; 
path_distance=rhs.path_distancei 
count_fil.ters=rhs. count_filters i 
securityMeasure=rhs.securityMeasure; 
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/* replace path*/ 
if (rhs.path) 
{ 
path=new int[countl;  
for(int i=Oj i<path_lengthj i++) path[il=rhs.path[i];  
} 
else 
path=NULL; 
return *thisj 
double Path::edge_distance(int v, int w) 
( 
for(int i=Oj i<nodes[v] .out_neighbor_countj i++) 
{ 
if(nodes[vl .out neighbors[i]==w){ -
return nodes [v] .distance[i];  
} 
return O.Of; 
bool Path::is_in-path(int vertex) 
{ 
int i; 
for(i=Oj i<path_lengthj i++) if(path[i]==vertex) return 
truej 
return false; 
void Path: : add_vertex (int vertex) 
{ 
if (path_length>O) 
path_distance+=edge_distance (path [path_length-I] I vertex); 
if (nodes [vertex] .isFilter(» count_filters++j 
path[path_length++]=vertex; 
securityMeasure=-lj 
void Path::delete_froffi_end() 
{ 
if (path_length>l) path_distance-
=edge_distance(path[path_length-2] I path[path length-I]); 
if(nodes[path[path_length-I]] .isFilter(» count_filters--j 
path_length--j 
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voi8ep~A~Y~~ffl~r¥=-1; 
{ 
int i; 
for(i=Oi i<path_length; i++) 
{ 
cout «path[i)«" "; 
} 
int Path: :getSecurityMeasure() 
{ 
II since securityMeasure takes some time to calculate, we 
cache it 
II once calculated. value of -1 means that securityMeasure 
was never 
II calculated for given path or that path updates 
invalidated securityMeasure
II so it needs to be racalculated 
if (securityMeasure==-l) recalcSecurityMeasure(); 
return securityMeasurei 
void Path: :markFilterCover(int vertex, boo1 *nodeMeasured) 
{ 
II algorithm: depth-first search b ckward (i.e. in 
direction 
II opposing to the edge direction) 
int j, neighbor; 
for(j=O; j<nodes[vertex) .in_neighbor_count j++) 
{ 
neighbor=nodes[vertex] .in neighbors[jJ i{ -
II stop if either neighbor is a filter or it's 
already marked 
II note: for this strategy work lOOt correctly, DO 
NOT 
II mark plain path nodes before marking spoofable 
nodes! 
if(!nodeslneighbor) .isFilter() && 
!nodeMeasured[neighbor) 
{ 
nodeMeasured[neighbor)=true; 
markFilterCover(neighbor, nodeMeasured); 
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} 
} 
void Path: :recalcSecurityMeasure() 
{ 
IIAlgorithrn:
II 1. marks all nodes that either part of the path
II or spoofable but not filters or final node 
II
II 2. calculate number if such nodes and return this count 
as the security measure 
II (smaller means better) 
II 
bool *nodeMeasured=n.ew bool[countl;  
int i;  
Ilinitially all nodes are "clean" 
for(i=O; i<count; i++) nodeMeasured[il=false; 
II for all nodes (except the final node) 
for(i=O; i<path length-1; i++)( -
if(nodes[path[i]] .isFilter(» Ilif node is a filter 
( 
Ilfind cover for this filter and mark it 
markFilterCover(path[i], nodeMeasured); 
II for all nodes (except the final node) 
for(i=O; i<path length-I; i++}{ -
if(lnodes[path[i]] .isFilter(» Ilif node is no a ilter 
nodeMeasured[path[i]]=true; Ilmark just his nod 
nodeMeasured[path[path_length-1]1 =false; Ilmake sure final 
node is not marked 
Ilcalculate securityMeasure 
securityMeasure=Oi 
for(i=Oi i<count; i++) 
if(nodeMeasured[i]} securityMeasure++; 
II free dynamic memory 
delete[] nodeMeasured; 
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nodes (nodes) , count (count) , 
~8sbMe:Rftl8ft@e~~~na~~S§s~@tuB2~~ec~28~al), cb(O) 
~ssume=unidirectional): -
visited from = new int[count];}; -
Paths: : -Paths () 
{ 
delete[] visited from; 
} 
//implements DFS strategy 
Path Paths: :find-paths(int start, int finish) 
( 
Path current-path(nodes, count);  
minimumPath=Path() ; 
find-path_between(start, finish, currentyath);  
return minimumPath; 
void Paths::find-path_between(int start, int finish, Path& 
partialyath) 
{ 
int i, neighbor; 
partial-path.add_vertex(start) ; 
/* for strategy 2, stop advancing current path if i 's 
length already biger than current best's length 
note: this can be accomplished in the middle of building 
path, i.e. we must not reach final node 
to determine this condition 
*/  
if( (strategy==2) 
&& minimumPath.exists() 
&& partial....Path.getLength(»=minimumPath.getLength(» 
/* we stopped at this point*/ 
partial-path.delete_from_end(l;  
return; 
} 
/* for strategy 3, apply selection strategy. note: we can 
apply this strategy only if we got whole 
path from start to finish built */ 
if( (start==finish) && (strategy==3) && 
minimumPath.exists(l ) 
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1* count of filter nodes*1 
int filters_cur=partialyath.getFiltersCount()i 
1* count of regular nodes (node is a regular node if and 
only if it's not a filter) *1 
lnt regular_cur=partialyath.getLength()-filters_cur; 
1* count of filter nodes*1 
int filters min=minimumPath.getFiltersCount(); 
1* count of-regular nodes (node is a regular node if and 
only if it's not a filter) *1 
int regular_min=minimumPath.getLength()-filters_mini 
bool cut= 
(filters min>O && filters cur==O) II prefer paths 
that have at least one filter 
I I (regular_cur> regular_min) II take path with 
minimum of regular nodes 
I I (filters cur< filters_min); II take path with 
maximum of filter nodes 
if(cut) 
{ 
1* we stopped at this point*1 
partialyath.delete_from_end() ; 
retu.rn; 
} 
if( (start==finish) &&(strategy==4) && 
minimumPath.exists() ) 
{ 
int sec_measure_cur=partialyath.getSecurityMeasure(); 
int sec_measure_min=minimumPath.getSecurityMeasure(); 
if(sec measure cur<=sec measure min){ - - - -
return; 
} 
} 
if (start==finish) 
( 
1* if path selection strategy applied earlier in this 
function not cuts path, it's assumed to be better 
than previous one 
*1 
minimumPath=partialyath; 
if(strategy==l && cb) cb(partialyath); 
#if PRINT ALL 
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cout «" Number of 
filters="«partial-path.getFiltersCount{) 
part~~l-Rep§=p~~~aftial-path.getLength() 
«" sec. measure="«minimumpath.getSecurityMeasure() 
«endli 
#endif 
partial-path.delete_from_end() i 
return; 
1* try every edge starting current vertex *1 
for(i=Oi i<nodes[start] .out_neighbor_count; i++) 
{ 
neighbor=nodes[start] .out_neighbors[i]; 
if(lpartial-path.is_in-path(neighbor») /* check neighbor 
node is not in the path yet *1 
{ 
bool skip=false; 
1* if edge has a limited bandwidth, don't go there*1 
if ((strategy>=2 ) && 
nodes [start] .bandwidth[i] <bandwidth) 
{ 
#if PRINT ALL 
cout «"Cut because of bandwidth restrictions:"; 
Ilpartial ath.print{}; 
cout « neighbor; 
cout « " 
Bootleneck=" «nodes [start] .bandwidth[iJ«endl; 
#endif 
skip=true; 
if (! skip) 
{ 
find-path_between(neighbor, finish, partial-path); 
} 
} 
/***********************************************************/ 
1/ statistics.h 
#ifndef STATISTICS H 
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#include <iostream.h> 
~~~~in@eST~a~§8~hS_H 
struct Hoplnfo 
{ 
int hOPSi 
int filters_total;  
int regular_total;  
int count_records; 
float avg_filters;  
float avg_regular;  
} ; 
struct Filterlnfo 
{ 
int filters; 
int hops_total; 
int count_records; 
float avg_hops; 
} ; 
struct HoplnfoAvg 
{ 
int hOPSi 
float avg_filters_total; 
float avg_regular_total; 
int count_records; 
float avg_avg_filters; 
float aV9_av9_regular; 
HoplnfoAv9(): aV9_filters_total(0.Of) I 
aV9_re9ular_total(0.Of) , 
count_records (0) , 
avg_avg_filters(O.Of) , aV9_av9_regular (0. Of) {}; 
} ; 
struct FilterlnfoAvg 
{ 
int filtersi 
float aV9_hops_total; 
int count_records; 
float avg_avg_hops; 
FilterlnfoAv9{): aV9 hops total{O.Of), count_records{O), 
aV9_av9_hops{O.Of) {};- -
} ; 
const int maxSize 100; 
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class Statistics 
{ 
private: 
Hoplnfo hoplnfo[maxSize]; 
Filterlnfo filterlnfo[maxSize]; 
HoplnfoAvg hoplnfoAvg[maxSize];  
FilterlnfoAvg filterlnfoAvg[maxSize] 
public: 
Statistics() i 
void startNetwork() i 
void addPath{Path& path) ; 
void finishNetwork() i 
void reportNetwork(ostream&); 
void calculateGlobalStat(); 
void reportGlobalStat(ostream&) i 
} i 
#endif IlsTATISTICS_H 
1***********************************************************1 
/1 statistics.cpp 
#include "statistics.h" 
Statistics: :Statistics() 
{ 
int i; 
for (i=O; i<maxSizei i++) 
{ 
hoplnfoAvg[i] . hops = i;  
filterlnfoAvg[i] . filters i·I 
void Statistics: : startNetwork () 
{ 
int 1.; 
for (i=Oi i<maxSize; i++) 
{ 
hoplnfo[iJ.hops = ii  
hoplnfo[i] . count_records 0; 
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hoplnfo[i] . regular_total = 0; 
!2P~~f!J!b{It+!~!@e~gt~li~0; 
filterlnfo[i] . count_records 0; 
filterInfo[i] .hops_total = 0; 
void Statistics: : addPath{Path& path) 
{ 
if(lpath.exists()} return; 
int hops=path.getLength()-l;  
int filters=path.getFiltersCount();  
int regular=path.getLength()-path.getFiltersCount();  
hopInfo[hops] . filters_total +=filters;  
hopInfo[hopsl .regular_total +=regular;  
hopInfo[hopsl.count_records++; 
filterInfo[filters] .hops_total +=hops; 
filterlnfo[filtersl . count records++; 
void Statistics::finishNetwork() 
{ 
int i; 
for (i=O; i<rnaxSize; i++) 
{ 
if (hopInfo[iJ . count records){ -
hoplnfo[il .avg_filters = (float) 
hoplnfo[i] . filters total/hoplnfo[il . count records; 
hoplnfo[i] .a~g_regular = (float) -
hoplnfo[i] .regular_total/hoplnfo[il . count_records; 
hoplnfoAvg[i] .avg filters total += 
hoplnfo[i] .avg_filters;- -
hopInfoAvg[i] .avg regular total += 
hoplnfo[i] .avg regular;- -
hopInfoAvg[il.count_records++; 
} 
else 
{ 
hoplnfo[i] .avg_filters hopInfo[il.avg_regular 0.0;} 
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if (filterlnfo[i] . count_records) 
{ 
filterlnfo[i] .avg hops = (float) 
filterlnfo[i] .hops total/filterlnfo[i] . count_records; 
filterlnfoAvg[i] .avg_hops_total += 
filterlnfo [i] .. avg hops; 
filterlnfoA;g[i] .count_records++; 
} 
else 
{ 
filterlnfo[i] .avg_hops 0.0; 
} 
void Statistics: :calculateGlobalStat{) 
{ 
int i; 
for (i=O; i<maxSize; i++) 
( 
if {hoplnfoAvg[i] . count records)( -
hopInfoAvg[i] .avg avg filters 
hoplnfoAvg[i] .avg_filte~s_total/hoplnfoAvg[i]. count_records; 
hoplnfoAvg[i] .avg avg regular 
hopInfoAvg[i] .avg regul~r total/hoplnfoAvg[i) . count records;} - - -
else 
{ 
hoplnfoAvg[i] .avg_avg_filters O.Of; 
hoplnfoAvg[i] .avg_avg_regular O.Of; 
if {filterlnfoAvg[i} . count records){ -
filterlnfoAvg[i] .avg avg hops 
filterlnfoAvg[i] .avg_hops_total/filterlnfoAvg[i] . count_records 
} 
else 
{ 
filterlnfoAvg[i] .avg avg hops O.Of;} - -
void Statistics: : reportNetwork{ostream& report} 
{ 
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for(i=O; i<maxSize-l; i++)tnt i, j;  
j=i+l;  
if (hoplnfo[j) . count_records) 
{ 
report «"\tNumber of hops:\t"«j«endl; 
report «"\t\tAverage 
filters:\t"«hoplnfo[j) .avg_filters«endl; 
report «"\t\tAverage 
regular:\t"«hoplnfo[j) .avg_regular«endl; 
} 
for(i=l; i<maxSizei i++) 
{ 
if (filterlnfo[il . count_records) 
{ 
report «"\tNumber of filters:\t"«i«end1i 
report «"\t\tAverage hop 
count:\t"«filterlnfo[i] .avg_hops«endl; 
} 
void Statistics::reportGlobalStat(ostream& report) 
{ 
int i, ji 
for(i=Oi i<maxSize-l; i++) 
{ 
j=i+l;  
if (hoplnfoAvg[j) . count_records) 
{ 
report «"Number of hops:\t"«j«endli 
report «"\tAverage 
filters:\t"«hoplnfoAvg[j) .avg_avg_filters«end1i 
report «"\tAverage 
regular:\t"«hoplnfoAvg[j) .avg_avg_regular«end1i 
} 
for (i=l; i<maxSize,; i++) 
{ 
if (filterlnfoAvg[i) . count records){ -
report «"Number of filters:\t"«i«endl; 
report «"\tAverage hop 
count:\t"«filterlnfoAvg[i) .avg_avg_hops«endl; 
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/***********************************************************/ 
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